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With the new Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "agency") rule prohibit-
ing "robocalls" going into effect,' it is a good time to consider other potential
improvements to the Telemarketing Sales Rule ("TSR"). One such change, an
improvement in the enforcement of the do not call provisions ("DNC") of the
TSR, could result in significant benefits to consumers, telemarketing compa-
nies, and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").
This Essay argues that telemarketers should be allowed to disclose viola-
tions of the DNC provisions before the start of a formal violation investigation,
in exchange for reduced penalties for those violations. The policy of preferen-
tial treatment for early disclosure of violations, called "voluntary self-
disclosure," has been used with great success for years by the U.S. Department
of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") and the U.S. Depart-
ment of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls ("DDTC"), among other
federal agencies.' The BIS' voluntary self-disclosure program provides a tem-
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1 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(4)(i), (b)(1)(v), (b)(1)(v)(A) (2008). The first amendment to
the Telemarketing Sales Rule "expressly Bar[s] telemarketing calls that deliver prere-
corded messages, unless a consumer previously has agreed to accept such calls from
the seller. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Issues Final Telemarketing
Sales Rule Amendments Regarding Prerecorded Calls (Aug. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/08/tsr.shtm. The second amendment "modifies the
[Telemarketing Sales Rule's] method of calculating the maximum permissible level of
'call abandonment."'
Id.
2 Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcementlindex.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2009);
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF MILITARY AFFAIRS, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE
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plate for the implementation of a change in the enforcement of the TSR. This
change to the DNC provisions could increase the detection of violations of the
DNC provisions and would help to align the interests of the telemarketers with
the interests of the FTC to enforce the provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
The DNC provisions of the TSR are a consumer protection initiative that
forbids telemarketing firms from contacting consumers that register their tele-
phone number with a national database called the National Do Not Call Regis-
try.' A firm that uses telemarketers to sell its products must pay for access to
the Registry and regularly check the list for updates every thirty-one days.4 All
telemarketers must consult the Registry before soliciting any person over the
phone.' A violation of the registry can result in civil penalties of up to $16,000
per violation. 6 The FTC and state attorneys general can initiate actions to en-
force the rules.7
The TSR contains a safe harbor provision to protect companies that inadver-
tently violate the DNC rules.' However, although most companies have written
CONTROLS, OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS COMPLIANCE, COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
GUIDELINES 4 (2008), available at
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/documents/compliance-programs.pdf
3 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii). A person who has registered their number on the DNC
list may be contacted by an exempt organization such as a charity, political group, or survey
organization. 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.6. A company with which a person has had a business rela-
tionship in the previous eighteen months is also exempt. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii).
Congress created the Do Not Call Registry in 2003, and permanently authorized it in 2008.
Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (2003); Do-
Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-187, 122 Stat. 633 (2008) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 6101 note). By October 2008, over 145 million phone numbers have been regis-
tered on the do not call list. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FY
2007 PURSUANT TO THE Do-NOT-CALL IMPLEMENTATION ACT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NATIONAL Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY 1 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 Do NOT CALL REPORT].
4 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(3)(iv). While companies can access registered numbers in five
area codes for free, they must pay $55 to access the registered numbers for each additional
area code and $15,058 for the entire U.S. database. FED. TRADE COMM'N, Q&A FOR TELE-
MARKETERS AND SELLERS ABOUT THE Do NOT CALL PROVISIONS OF THE FTC's TELEMARKET-
ING SALES RULE 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt129.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Q&A].
5 16 C.F.R. § 310.8(a).
6 FTC Q&A, supra note 4, at 8.
7 See id. at 1.
8 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(3). The safe harbor provision states that a telemarketer will have
reduced penalties for violations if the FTC determines that: a) a telemarketer "has estab-
lished and implemented written procedures to honor consumers' requests that they not be
called"; b) the telemarketer "has trained its personnel and any entity assisting" in the seller's
compliance procedures; c) the seller maintains an "entity-specific do not call list"; d) the
seller has "a process to prevent calls to any entity on their entity-specific Do Not Call list or
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procedures in place, application of this safe harbor has been a source of frustra-
tion to companies that have been penalized for violations of the DNC rules
despite being able to demonstrate the good faith efforts they made to comply.9
The FTC may view such violations as evidence that the compliance procedures
were ineffective and therefore not protected by the safe harbor provision. The
agency's enforcement of the TSR provisions has created other problems, as
well.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE DO NOT CALL RULES
There are several problems with the FTC's enforcement of the DNC rules.
First, it is likely that some violations will not be reported because of an unwill-
ingness of people to complain. Second, violations may not be reported because
some DNC registrants who receive unwanted calls from telemarketers do not
know the process for registering a complaint with the FTC. Third, a company
has the perverse incentive to hide and obscure violations from the FTC when
that company becomes aware of its violations. Finally, there can be a long de-
lay in the time between a violation and the payment of a penalty for a viola-
tion, making the penalty less relevant to the violator. All of these problems can
be corrected, at least in part, by adopting an enforcement policy to allow for a
reduction in penalties for telemarketers who report violations of the DNC pro-
visions of the TSR to the FTC before the agency begins a formal investigation
of the violations. Because the TSR gives discretion in setting the level of fines
for DNC violations," no amendments to the TSR would be needed to imple-
ment this enforcement policy. This Essay will refer to the process of reporting
violations of the DNC rules in exchange for favorable treatment as "voluntary
self-disclosure."
IV. VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURE
Voluntary self-disclosure is a policy that has been successfully used for
on the National Do Not Call Registry"; e) someone working with the telemarketer "monitors
and enforces compliance with the entity's Do Not Call procedures"; and ) subsequent calls
were the result of an error. Federal Trade Commission, Facts For Business: Complying With
the Telemarketing Sales Rule,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/marketing/bus27.shtm (last visited Nov. 12,
2009).
9 See Do Not Call Violations Snare DIRECTV, Comcast, Dish Network, ENTREPRE-
NEUR, June 2009, available at
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/202716807.html (noting that the FTC
fined Comcast $900,000 recently, despite Comcast having a 99.85 percent compliance with
the Do Not Call regulations).
10 FTC Q&A, supra note 4, at 1.
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many years by the BIS and the DDTC," which reduces the penalties for com-
panies that report their non-compliance with export control regulations before
the agencies have started a formal investigation of those violations.12 Voluntary
self-disclosure reports must include an explanation of when and how violations
occurred and the identities of all individuals and organizations that were in-
volved in a company's violations. 3 A description of any mitigating circum-
stances should also be included in the disclosure.
Companies that file reports that are not accurate and thorough typically re-
ceive less mitigation of their penalties. 4 Complete, well received reports can
often result in warning letters from the agencies without financial penalties
(particularly from DDTC). 5 BIS recommends that a company review its re-
cords so as to include violations from the five years prior to the date of its ini-
tial notification. 6 Even when a voluntary self-disclosure report is accepted, if
the report is later found to be incomplete, the agencies may levy full fines on
the unreported violations. 7 Thus, firms have an incentive to make voluntary
self-disclosure reports accurate and complete when they decide to self-report. 8
The benefits that are experienced by exporters and agencies that regulate con-
trolled exports from voluntary self-disclosure are transferable to telemarketers
and the FTC.
V. ADVANTAGES OF VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURE
Voluntary self-disclosure would make enforcement of the DNC rules proac-
tive rather than reactive. To reduce or avoid penalties, companies would re-
view their call records thoroughly to preempt a FTC investigation with a vol-
untary self-disclosure. If a company waits too long to review their records, the
I See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
12 15 C.F.R. § 764.5 (2008); 22 C.F.R. § 127.12(c)(1) (2009). A company is allowed to
file an initial notification which broadly sketches out its violations. If the company later
makes a more detailed filing, the initial notification sets the date that the voluntary disclo-
sure is filed. Id.
13 15 C.F.R. § 764.5; 22 C.F.R. § 127.12.
14 Wendy Wysong, BIS DATA Shows Benefits of Voluntary Self-Disclosure, EXPORT
PRACTITIONER, Dec. 2006, at 4.
15 U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/indext.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2009)
(noting that of the Voluntary Self Disclosures (VSDs) "resolved in Fiscal Year 2005, 97%
were resolved with either a finding that no violation of the EAR [Export Administration
Regulations] ... or with the issuance of a warning letter . .
16 15 C.F.R. § 764 (c)(3).
17 Id.
Is Disclosure reports also commonly include an explanation of how the reporting com-
pany has already improved or is in the process of improving their policies, processes and
systems, and training in an effort to avoid future violations. Id.
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FTC may discover do not call violations and initiate an investigation. If the
FTC begins a formal investigation before the company files a voluntary self-
disclosure, the company would not receive the benefit of a reduction in penal-
ties. Thus, voluntary self-disclosure would align the FTC and the telemar-
keter's interests-both entities would want to expose violations as quickly and
thoroughly as possible.
Proactive enforcement reduces the risk that violations will go unreported."
As the DNC provisions are now enforced, violations involving people who are
not willing to complain or do not know how to report unwanted telemarketer
calls have little chance of coming to light.2" In contrast, companies who would
want to take advantage of voluntary self-disclosure would have to review their
records for violations going back a number of years. As part of the review
process, violations that may not otherwise have been exposed would become
known and would be reported.
Voluntary self-disclosure gives companies an incentive to report violations.
At present, telemarketers only receive penalties for violations of the DNC list
that the FTC discovers. Thus, telemarketers have a financial reason to keep
quiet regarding-or even possibly obscure-DNC violations that the marketer
discovers but that the FTC has not yet discovered.2' Voluntary self-disclosure
motivates companies to report violations before the FTC begins a formal inves-
tigation.
Penalties become more timely and relevant when voluntary self-disclosure is
allowed. Currently, several years may pass between the beginning of an inves-
tigation and penalty collection.22 As time passes, penalties may lose their rele-
vance to the company involved. Management may distance themselves from
the responsibility for past violations. Consequently, investigated telemarketers
may fail to take the necessary steps to prevent future violations. However, vol-
untary self-disclosure requires speedy, company-initiated reviews to obtain
meaningful penalty reduction. Penalty payments are thereby received closer to
the time of violation, making these payments more pertinent to the violating
19 In the export enforcement area, a significant percentage of enforcement cases involve
voluntary self-disclosures. See Philip S. Rhodes, The International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions: Compliance and Enforcement in the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls U.S. De-
partment of State, in Practicing Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Course Hand-
book Series, Coping with U.S. Export Controls (2008), available at WL 910 PLI!Comm
443, 472.
20 See supra Part III.
21 Based on the FTC's record of enforcement, currently a company does not have an
incentive to admit to even an inadvertent call to a person on the Registry. See Federal Trade
Commission, Do Not Call Enforcement Action Announcements - Alphabetical List,
http://ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/donotcall/cases.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (listing a
total of sixty-three Do Not Call registry enforcement actions from 2003 to 2009).
22 See 2007 Do NOT CALL REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-12.
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companies. The speed and the detail needed for an effective voluntary self-
disclosure would also reduce the investigative resources and time involved in
the FTC's investigations of DNC violations, saving the agency time and
money.
VI. PUBLIC RELATIONS
Companies that make voluntary self-disclosures could gain a significant
public relations advantage in addition to the benefits discussed above. Cur-
rently, the public first gains knowledge of DNC violations through FTC press
releases. After such negative exposure, companies must work to control the
damage to their reputations. Under the proposed policy, a voluntary self-
disclosure that is accepted by the FTC would allow a company to mitigate the
negative press from a FTC announcement by pointing out that violations were
self-reported and corrective actions have been implemented. Such announce-
ments can be the first step in a public relations campaign to redeem the com-
pany's image after the company discovers a violation. The FTC would also
benefit from the public's perception that more DNC violations have been dis-
covered.
VII. CONCLUSION
The FTC should amend its enforcement of the TSR to allow companies to
disclose violations of the DNC provisions prior to the start of a formal FTC
investigation in return for reduced penalties. This change in enforcement pol-
icy would help to better align the interests of telemarketers with the interests of
the FTC in exposing and correcting violations of the DNC rules. The success-
ful use of voluntary self-disclosure by other federal agencies demonstrates that
voluntary self-disclosure can be an efficient and effective strategy to reform
the enforcement of the TSR to the benefit of consumers, telemarketers, and the
FTC.
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